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Prologue 
Every generation has its defining moment. For my grandparents it was Pearl 
Harbor. My parents had the Kennedy assassination and for my generation, we had 9/11. 
In September of 2001, I was eighteen years old and that fall I had started my freshman 
year of college. Being away from home was not easy on me. Like most people who are 
away for the first time I missed my family, my friends and the routine of life that I had 
become accustomed to over the years. But I soldiered through those first awkward couple 
of weeks by engulfing myself into my studies. I began my collegiate career as a 
communications major. My life goal was to be a radio disc jockey. I always loved music 
so I figured in my infinite teenage wisdom that getting paid to talk and listen to my 
favorite songs all day was the way to go. It is safe to say that my world view was very 
narrow and naive.  
I think growing up in Middle America during the 1990‟s made me that way. I was 
sheltered from the kind of hard times that my grandparents always were lecturing me 
about. Granted, I was always one to keep up with current world events but I never 
thought they affected me whatsoever. I knew that someone somewhere was living a life 
full of hardships that I could not imagine, and since I could not imagine them – I didn‟t. 
The world had just always seemed so big, and because of its vastness I always believed 
that anything bad would stay far away. I thought I was untouchable. Then came the 
morning of 11 September 2001. 
 I got up early that morning like I had any other Tuesday morning; I did my hair, 
brushed my teeth, got my things together and went off to class. Everything seemed to be 
2 
 
going along like it always had. I arrived back at my dorm around 10:00 in the morning, 
still completely unaware that anything was happening. While I was in the lobby of my 
dormitory I could hear people talking about something out of the ordinary and I could tell 
that their tone was distressed. Without being able to hear exact details my first thought 
was that a school had been shot up since that sort of thing was unfortunately quite 
common in those days. Losing interest I walked up the stairs to my room, opened the 
door and turned on the television. Sometimes life is surreal and you find yourself in 
places that you never thought you would ever be. This was one of those moments. On the 
T.V. was a live picture of the Pentagon with smoke billowing out of the top of it. The 
graphic on the screen said, “New York and Washington Under Attack.” My eyes were 
fixated on the screen looking at an image I never thought I would see. Not knowing what 
to do I did the only thing an eighteen year old could do at a moment like that – I called 
my mom.  
 My mother was frantic when I called her. All of her co-workers, like others all 
across the country, were huddled around a T.V. set at their office watching the events 
unfold. She told me to get some of my things together and to get home right away. 
Ironically, I had planned on going home that day anyway because I had to pick up a few 
items from my house that I needed at school. I had a math class to go to at 11:00 and my 
professor was less than accommodating toward people who missed his class – so I went. 
When I arrived in class the attacks were all anyone could talk about. As students, we did 
not know how we would be able to focus on advanced algebra while our fellow citizens 
were dying. When my teacher walked in I thought he was going to cry. This was the 
same guy who on the first day of class told us that when his mother died he was back 
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teaching the next day. He told us that he understood that our concentration was going to 
be challenged, but that we should continue with class anyway. About ten minutes into 
class a woman walked in and told us to leave, that they were shutting down the 
university. Upon hearing that news I went back to my dorm, did a couple of things, got 
into my car and drove home. 
 I got home around 2:00 in the afternoon. By that point the attacks had stopped. 
When I got in my house the first thing I did, again, was turn on the television. I remember 
that almost every cable station was either playing affiliated news coverage or had 
completely gone off the air with a generic message saying something like, “because of 
today‟s tragic events we have suspended broadcasting.” So for the rest of the afternoon I 
just sat there glued, absorbing all of the information being thrown at me. That evening, 
somebody put luminaries all down my street in remembrance of the victims and this older 
woman on my street with tears in her eyes told some of my friends and I that she was so 
sorry that we had to witness this and that she had hoped that her generation would be the 
last to see America be attacked. Now my generation had its day of infamy. 
 My emotions did not get to me until that night. I can recall laying on my couch 
finally letting the past twelve hours marinate into my psyche. For the first time in my 
entire life I was actually scared to be an American. I was glad to be at home because I 
had always felt safe there, but that night I did not. That was when everything changed for 
me. I had so many questions about what had happened: who did this? Why did they do it? 
Was it going to happen again? And perhaps most importantly, how could we have let this 
happen? It is safe to say that my days of yearning for the disc jockey‟s chair were 
officially over. I became obsessed with the inner workings of our government and the 
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apparatuses there within whose job it was to keep us safe. It had become my passion and 
I needed to know as much about it as possible.   
  In this analysis, I will not only give a chronology of the struggle between the 
United States and Islamic terrorism over the past thirty years, but I will also attempt to 
provide an answer to that important question of why our government failed us so 
miserably leading up to 9/11 and furthermore, whether the response by our leaders to 
those attacks, been successful in both combating terrorism around the world and also in 
keeping the United States safe.  
The seeds of Islamic fundamentalism were planted before I was even born, and 
because of the American Government‟s inability to effectively stop it in its infancy, it 
continues to plague nation states and societies all over the world. The United States might 
have declared war on al Qaeda in late 2001; however, the enemy was at war with us long 
before then. The story of Islamic terrorism as we know it began almost three decades ago 
as a part of the Cold War in the country of Afghanistan, where it continues to this day.  
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The Afghan people have paid a terrible price in their fight for freedom. Their 
villages and homes have been destroyed; they have been murdered by bullets, 
bombs and chemical weapons. One-fifth of the Afghan people have been driven 
into exile. Yet their fight goes on. The international community, with the United 
States joining governments around the world, has condemned the invasion of 
Afghanistan as a violation of every standard of decency and international law and 
has called for a withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Every country 
and every people has a stake in the Afghan resistance, for the freedom fighters of 
Afghanistan are defending principles of independence and freedom that form the 
basis of global security and stability. 
– Ronald Reagan, Afghanistan Day, 10 March 1982 
 
 
 
On Christmas Eve, 1979, the Soviet Army invaded the country of Afghanistan. 
The Communist government of Afghanistan requested that Soviet troops be deployed 
there to help fight against the growing number of Islamic rebels who were intent on 
overthrowing the communist regime. As the Soviets continued to build up their military 
forces, the Mujahideen used insurgent tactics similar to those employed by groups like 
the Vietcong during the Vietnam War. As the conflict continued throughout the 1980‟s, 
more and more young men from around the Middle East descended on Afghanistan to 
repel the communist invaders. By 1988, after almost ten years of war, the Soviets decided 
that the price paid in blood and money was not worth extending the conflict. All Soviet 
troops were out of Afghanistan by early 1989. 
 As a result of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Islamic fundamentalist movement was 
born. A man who would become a key figure down the road in this movement rose to 
prominence during the Soviet-Afghan conflict. Osama bin Ladin, a Saudi national, was a 
young man in the early 1980‟s when he made his way to Afghanistan. He eventually 
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became a leader of the Mujahideen because of the immense wealth of his family. Bin 
Ladin would later opine about the Soviet invasion, “I was enraged and went [to 
Afghanistan] at once. I arrived within days, before the end of 1979.”1 While in 
Afghanistan, bin Ladin also put together a prolific network for financing the insurgency, 
funneling money donated by wealthy individuals, mostly in the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
states. Ironically, many western nations, including the United States, supplied huge 
amounts of money and weapons to the rebels as the Cold War continued to rage. Bin 
Ladin was also heavily involved in recruiting fighters to take up arms in Afghanistan.  
 As the war with the Soviets wound down, bin Ladin wanted to keep the 
Mujahideen organized in order to fight similar battles all over the world. Along with the 
Cleric Azzam, whom Bin Ladin worked closely with during the war against the Soviets, 
the two men established what they called a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a potential 
general headquarters for future jihad.
2
 Any doubts on who should be in charge of the new 
group were nullified when Azzam was killed in late 1989 by a car bomb.  
 Paradoxically, it was another assassination that would lead Bin Ladin to his other 
chief deputy. The late 1980‟s saw a large crackdown on Islamic fundamentalism 
following the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Many people sympathetic to or 
involved in the fundamentalist movement fled Egypt including  a surgeon named Ayman 
al-Zawahiri who would forge close ties with bin Ladin which continue to present day.  
 By 1991, Osama bin Ladin found a permanent home in the African country of 
Sudan. The government there agreed to harbor the terrorist leader. During the early 
1990‟s, bin Ladin set up a complex network of finance that brought in vast amounts of 
                                                 
1
 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, [Knopf,  2006] p. 109 
2
 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Repor: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States [W.W Norton and Company,  2005]  p. 56 
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monetary wealth along with large quantities of weapons. Protected by the government of 
Sudan, his organization growing in size and wealth, and his message resonating with 
young Muslim‟s around the world, Osama bin Ladin declared war against a new enemy, 
the United States of America.  
II 
 The early 1990‟s was a period of transition within the U.S. intelligence 
community. The conventional wisdom was that we had won the cold war and it was time 
to reap the peaceful dividend.
3
 However, the reality was completely the contrary. Shortly 
after the Gulf War ended in 1991, Osama bin Laden began to preach his hatred for the 
American government. Speaking at a family mosque, bin Laden threatened the U.S., 
saying, “The Americans won‟t stop their support of Jews in Palestine until we give them 
a lot of blows. They won‟t stop until we do Jihad against them.”4 At the time, bin Ladin 
was barely known by the intelligence community and was believed to be little more than 
a wealthy Middle-Eastern business man.  
During the early 1990‟s, the entire intelligence community, not just the CIA, lost 
billions of dollars in funding and the workforce was slashed by almost 25 percent.
5
 The 
post Cold War peace that many in the government were counting on never materialized 
as a new kind of threat was simultaneously emerging overseas. This new threat came to 
fruition on February 26, 1993, when an explosion shook the World Trade Center in lower 
Manhattan.
6
  The explosion blew through six stories of structural steel and cement, all the 
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 George Tenet, The Center of the Storm – My Years at the CIA, [HarperCollins, 2007]  p. 14 
4
 Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 171 
5
 Tenet, The Center of the Storm , p. 14 
6
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way down to the PATH train station below the garage and up to the Marriot ballroom 
above it.
7
 The FBI in New York City immediately went to work to find those who were 
responsible for the attack. Within days, the FBI identified a truck remnant as part Ryder 
rental van reported stolen in Jersey City the day before the bombing.
8
 When the 
accomplice who rented the van went back to the rental place to collect money he thought 
was owed to him claiming the vehicle had been stolen, the FBI arrested him.  
Unlike future al-Qaeda related attacks, the first World Trade Center bombing was 
not a suicide attack. The mastermind behind the assault was Ramzi Yousef. Yousef had 
been highly trained in bomb-making at an al-Qaeda terror camp in Afghanistan. Although 
it created mass confusion and killed six people, the attack was deemed a failure. Yousef‟s 
plan was to blow out a portion of one tower‟s lower infrastructure in order to topple it 
thereby bringing down the other tower. With Yousef‟s relationship with bin Laden 
unclear, it is believed that the finances for the bombing were sent from bin Ladin to Omar 
Abdul Rahman, also known as the blind Sheikh. Rahman was a veteran of Islamic 
extremism. During the 1980‟s he was imprisoned in Egypt as he awaited trial over the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat. He was eventually acquitted. As soon as he got out of 
prison in Egypt, he started trying to get into the United States. He succeeded in 1990.
9
 
Abdul Rahman was seeking asylum in the U.S., despite being listed as a terrorist on the 
State Department watch list.
10
  
At the time of the World Trade Center bombing, Rahman was in charge of a 
mosque in Brooklyn and consistently taught hatred against the U.S. to his followers, 
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8
 9/11 Commission, p. 72 
9
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10
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which included Ramzi Yousef. During the investigation of the bombing, an FBI 
informant very familiar with the blind Sheikh and the mosque he ran tipped off the 
authorities of his connection to Ramzi Yousef and the other suspects. As a result of this 
information, the FBI was able to arrest Rahman and four other men in connection to the 
attack on the World Trade Center. The adequate law enforcement response set the tone 
for how the United States Government would deal with terrorism throughout the 1990‟s. 
Following the investigation, then President Bill Clinton said, “I was pleased with the 
effectiveness of our law enforcement work, but troubled by the evident vulnerability of 
our open society to terror.”11 The only person involved who eluded the authorities was 
Ramzi Yousef. 
Yousef fled the United States for Pakistan on the night of the bombing. While 
overseas, Yousef along with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, began devising 
terrorist attacks on a grandiose scale of the likes had never been attempted. In 1994, after 
a failed plot to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the two men began 
to work on what was known as the Bojinka plot. Serbo-Croat for “big explosion,” 
Bojinka was a complex and breathtakingly lethal operation.
12
 The plan had three parts. 
The first and most intricate piece of the plot was their intention of blowing up 11 
commercial airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Yousef had done a trial run in late 1994, 
where he boarded a plane in the Philippines and planted a bomb under his seat while in 
flight. He then got off after the plane landed and the bomb went off as the same plane 
made its way to its final destination. All of the planes that Yousef wanted to target were 
to be headed to the United States. The last two parts of the Bojinka plot involved high 
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level assassinations. Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or KSM, wanted to kill 
President Clinton and Pope John Paul II as they planned to head to East Asia. 
Fortunately, Filipino authorities foiled the plot after Yousef‟s Manila apartment caught 
fire.   
After the Bojinka plot failed, Yousef again returned to Pakistan where he 
continued to evolve his notable bomb making skills. While in Islamabad, he stayed at a 
guest house owned by Osama bin Laden. In early 1995, a man associated with Yousef 
walked into the U.S. embassy in Islamabad and told American authorities he could help 
them capture Yousef who at the time was the most wanted terrorist in the world.  
At 9:30am Pakistani time on February 7, 1995, Pakistani intelligence agents along 
with the FBI entered the Su-Casa Guest House in Islamabad and knocked on the door of 
room 16. Yousef was immediately thrown to the floor and handcuffed.
13
 Ramzi Yousef 
was sent back to the United States where he stood trial and was convicted on a number of 
charges. He is currently serving a 240 year sentence in Colorado.
14
 
III 
 By the mid 1990‟s, Osama bin Ladin was safe and secure inside Sudan. From his 
African safe haven, his terror group was working on numerous attacks that bin Ladin was 
himself financing through numerous business ventures. However, the tide began to turn 
by the middle of 1995. In June of that year, there was an attempt to assassinate Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak while visiting Ethiopia. The would-be killers, who came from 
the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by bin Ladin.
15
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Following the failed plot, enormous amounts of international pressure were put on the 
Sudanese to expel OBL.  
By early 1996, the Sudanese government, suffering from severe economic 
sanctions, elected to give up bin Ladin. They first asked the Saudi‟s (bin Laden was born 
in Saudi Arabia) to take him; however, they promptly refused. The Saudis had revoked 
OBL‟s citizenship years before. After the Saudis refused to take the terror leader, reports 
claim that the Sudanese offered to hand over bin Ladin to the United States. A high 
ranking Sudanese official at the time reportedly told the CIA, “we are ready to hand him 
to you.”16 American authorities refused to take him because he had not been indicted for 
any crimes against the United States at the time, so they felt holding him would be illegal.  
Although nobody was willing to take bin Ladin, the Sudanese nonetheless asked 
him to leave the country. Bin Ladin also began to have serious money problems. 
International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan‟s 
currency and some of bin Ladin‟s companies ran short of funds.17 Financially hurting, 
Osama bin Ladin accepted an invitation to go back to Afghanistan in May of 1996. This 
move proved to be of great utility to bin Ladin and al-Qaeda.
18
 While in Afghanistan, he 
would eventually ally himself with the Taliban and transform al-Qaeda into a powerful 
organization with an international presence.  
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IV 
 It was not until Osama bin Ladin made his move to Afghanistan that the 
American intelligence community began to take the threat al Qaeda posed seriously. In 
fact, some inside the intel community were glad to see bin Ladin go to Afghanistan 
believing that he would be secluded and marginalized. However, the reality would 
eventually turn out to be quite the contrary. The Taliban, who ruled most of Afghanistan 
at the time bin Ladin emigrated, were at first skeptical of the terror leader. They soon 
came to realize that OBL could possibly help their impotent economy and promptly 
embraced him. The Taliban invited bin Ladin to leave Islamabad and move to Kandahar, 
which was the center of Taliban rule.  
Meanwhile, back in the United States there were three main players emerging in 
the fight against al Qaeda. In 1996, the CIA was putting together what came to be known 
as the “bin Ladin Unit,” headed up by Michael Scheurer. The FBI was also beginning to 
put assets together to combat al Qaeda. Scheuer‟s counterpart in the FBI was John 
O‟Neill. O‟Neill was an eccentric personality and a veteran law enforcement official 
when it came to dealing with terrorism. He was believed to be one of the foremost 
experts in that department. Finally the Clinton Administration‟s terrorism czar, Richard 
Clarke, was the third player. Unlike Scheurer or O‟Neill, Clarke had the ears of high level 
government officials including Cabinet members and even the president himself.  
 Unfortunately, bitter personal differences and long time agency rivalries caused a 
rift between O‟Neill and Scheurer. They were the two men most responsible for putting a 
stop to bin Ladin and al Qaeda, and yet they disliked each other intensely – an emotion 
13 
 
that reflected and ingrained antagonism of the organizations they represented.
19
 The 
division between the CIA and FBI caused each organization to be suspicious of each 
other at a time where their cooperation was vital. Their failure to adequately work 
together and share crucial intelligence would not be corrected until after the 9/11 attacks.  
V 
 In mid 1997, the CIA began devising an elaborate plan to capture Osama bin 
Ladin in Afghanistan and bring him back to the United States to stand trial. The plan 
would involve elements of the CIA but would mostly depend on Afghan tribals. The 
tribals were not only used because of their expertise of the terrain but also so that if the 
operation went wrong American blood would not be spilled.  
The objective was to infiltrate Tarnak Farms, which was believed to be bin 
Ladin‟s residence at the time. A compound of about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings 
surrounded by a 10-foot wall, Tarnak Farms a located in an isolated desert area on the 
outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
20
 At each corner of the wall was a machine gun nest 
and parked outside were two T-55 tanks.
21
 The tribals were to go into bin Ladin‟s 
residence at night and capture him while he was asleep. They would then transport him to 
an airstrip where an unmarked CIA plane would be waiting. The plane would eventually 
make its way to New York City.  
 However, back in Washington, the plan was received with mixed reaction. At 
first, the plan met very little resistance as it was scattered throughout the proper intel 
agencies. Richard Clarke and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger both seemed to 
initially endorse the plan, although Clarke wrote to Berger that it seemed “somewhat 
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embryonic,” he also referred to it later as “half-assed.”22 Many field level CIA operatives, 
including Michael Scheurer, felt that this was the best plan to capture bin Ladin. In fact, 
the CIA ran numerous rehearsals of the operation, expecting that it would eventually be 
approved at the highest level.  
By May of 1998, upper level cabinet officials including Sandy Berger and 
Attorney General Janet Reno, along with Richard Clarke and the Director of Central 
Intelligence George Tenet all expressed serious reservations about the plot. Clarke was 
afraid that if bin Ladin was brought to the U.S., there would not be enough evidence to 
indict him. On May 29, the decision was made not to go ahead with the operation. The 
cabinet-level officials thought that the risk of civilian casualties –“collateral damage” – 
was too high. They were also worried about the safety of the tribals.
23
 
 According to Richard Clarke, “the Counterterrorism Security Group unanimously 
decided against the assault. One of the many urban legends about al Qaeda that emerged 
after September 11 was that Attorney General Janet Reno had vetoed the operation. Not 
true. George Tenet and I did, to avoid getting all of our Afghan assets killed for 
nothing.”24 No other plan of this magnitude was ever tried by the American government 
to capture Osama bin Laden. In November of 1998, bin Laden was indicted by a United 
States Grand Jury in New York for conspiracy to kill American citizens.
25
 
VI 
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On 7 August, 1998, powerful bombs ripped apart the American embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Salaam, Tanzania, leaving 184 dead, including 12 Americans.
26
 
Almost immediately, the al Qaeda terror network was the primary suspect behind the 
deadly attacks thanks to good intel out of Nairobi. In fact, CIA director George Tenet 
even told President Clinton that it was a “slam dunk” that the bombings were the work of 
al Qaeda, a phrase he would also use years later to convince George W. Bush that 
Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction. 
 Throughout the first half of 1998, Osama bin Ladin made numerous statements in 
which he declared war on the United States. On February 23
 of that year, the “World 
Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” issued a fatwa, a declaration of war, 
signed by Osama bin Ladin. The Front announced its desire to kill all Americans, even 
civilians. This marked the first time bin Ladin had publicly declared war on American 
civilians.
27
  With these declarations and threats, the embassy bombings frankly came as 
no surprise.  
 Following the attack, the American Government was finally prepared and 
believed that it had sufficient grounds to retaliate against al Qaeda and more specifically 
Osama bin Ladin. The Clinton Administration decided that the best way to strike back 
was to do so with Tomahawk cruise missiles, which seemed to be their preferred use of 
military force. They proposed firing Tomahawks against eight terrorist camps in 
Afghanistan, including bin Ladin‟s compound at Tarnak Farms.28 Debate also ensued 
about whether or not to target areas outside of Afghanistan. Eventually, the decision was 
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made to bomb a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan because it was thought to be tied to bin 
Ladin but also because it was believed to be making a chemical weapon.  
 The attacks were carried out on 20 August 1998. In Afghanistan, many of the 
terror camps were destroyed as a result of the bombardment. However, Osama bin Ladin 
avoided injury. It is believed that American officials, perhaps as high up as the Secretary 
of State, decided to inform Pakistani authorities of the impending attack. The rational 
behind notifying the Pakistani‟s was to avoid a reaction by Pakistan if they thought the 
missile was coming from their rival neighbor India. Both had detonated nuclear weapons 
that same year. Many people inside the American intelligence community believe that the 
Pakistanis tipped off bin Ladin as a result.  
Regardless, the attacks failed to get bin Ladin. Moreover, in Sudan, the bombs hit 
their intended target. However, the bombing of the pharmaceutical plant was a mistake. 
The result of the hasty strike was that the impoverished country of Sudan lost one of its 
most important manufacturers, which employed 300 people and produced more than half 
of the country‟s medicines.29 No connection between Osama bin Ladin or al Qaeda and 
the plant was found. 
Back in Washington, Richard Clarke hoped that the embassy bombings would 
force the Clinton Administration to put together a long term pro-active plan to deal with 
al Qaeda. Instead, Clinton continued his policy of only going after the leaders of al Qaeda 
using precision strikes with weapons fired from, in some cases, thousands of miles away. 
To his credit, President Clinton did authorize, on numerous occasions in fact, the ability 
of the United States to basically assassinate Osama bin Ladin. Unfortunately, the tactics 
used to go about killing OBL proved time and time again to be wholly ineffective.  
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VII 
 Despite President Clinton‟s numerous declarations to his advisors in the latter half 
of 1998 that he was doing his utmost to go after Islamic terrorism, two major events, one 
domestic and one foreign, would consume his administration over the next year. On the 
foreign policy side, Iraq was becoming a large nuisance for the American government. 
Their unwillingness to comply with weapons inspections, of which they were required as 
a result of the first Gulf War, was beginning to illicit some sort of response from the 
West. On 17 December 1998, the United States and Great Britain commenced operation 
Desert Fox, which was a large scale bombing of Iraq using aircraft and cruise missiles.
30
 
Ironically, during the Iraqi bombing, the CIA reported having actionable intelligence of 
the whereabouts of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan. The CIA advised the White House 
to capture or kill bin Ladin, but they did nothing.  
 Meanwhile, President Clinton was embroiled in an impeachment trial for lying 
under oath about his relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. The House 
of Representatives voted in favor of impeachment during operation Desert Fox. As a 
result, some Republicans in Congress had accused the president of something known as 
“wagging the dog,” which basically means that he launched the strike simply to divert 
attention from his own personal problems. Regardless of his reasons, the Lewinsky 
scandal undoubtedly preoccupied the president during a time when his full attention 
would have been most valuable in going after the al Qaeda network. The year 1998 
proved to be a turning point in the struggle against al Qaeda and as the millennium was 
fast approaching, it seemed clear that Osama bin Ladin had the upper hand. 
VIII 
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 During 1999, as the world prepared to usher in a new millennium, 
counterterrorism and law enforcement officials knew that the celebrations that would take 
place around the globe would be prime targets for terrorists. In the United States, the FBI 
and other law enforcement agencies were extremely proactive in attempting to thwart any 
such attack. However, it was the Jordanians who were first to foil an attack. On 30 
November 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu 
Zubaydah, a longtime ally of bin Ladin, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist.
31
 
When police searched rented houses in Amman, they found numerous suspicious 
materials including bomb making equipment. More than a dozen men were arrested and 
Washington was informed. Interestingly, one of the men involved in the plot who 
avoided being captured was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later go on to lead al 
Qaeda in the Iraq War. 
 Back in the U.S., intelligence officials feared that what was found in Jordan was 
part of a larger imminent attack. John O‟Neill at the FBI was particularly concerned that, 
as the millennium approached, al Qaeda would seize the moment to dramatize its war 
with America.
32
 Then, on 14 December 1999, thanks to a single border guard‟s simple 
intuition, an Algerian man named Ahmed Ressam was arrested attempting to enter the 
United States from Canada. Ressam tried to get into the country via car, but when 
stopped at the border crossing, his suspicious behavior led to a search of his vehicle. 
Once the trunk was opened, agents found two canisters of nitroglycerine, 118 pounds of 
urea, and four Casio watches wired to batteries and circuit boards. After an investigation, 
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it was discovered that Ressam‟s intended target was to be Los Angeles International 
Airport. He planned to carry out his attack on or around New Years Day.
33
  
 The fact that a terrorist was captured attempting to enter the United States was 
quite distressing to counterterrorism officials. After his arrest, law enforcement officials 
found a piece of paper in Ressam‟s pocket with a phone number on it. After being 
checked out, the number belonged to another Algerian man living in Brooklyn, New 
York. Subsequently, the FBI began to stakeout the man‟s home and on December 30, 
John O‟Neill arrested the man on conspiracy charges and a number of other suspected 
terrorists on immigrations violations. 
34
  
 The United States dodged a huge bullet at the end of 1999, and most of the 
government‟s success was a result of sheer luck. However, following the millennium 
scare, it became evident to some, including John O‟Neill and Richard Clarke, that 
terrorists intended to carry out strikes inside the U.S., and some sleeper cells might 
already be embedded in the country. As the year 2000 was rung in without a hitch, the 
real question was whether the Clinton Administration would finally get tough on 
terrorism in its last full year in office, or would it simply wait it out and pass the problem 
to the next president, whomever that might be? 
IX 
 The year 2000 saw some evolution in the Clinton Administration‟s plans when it 
came to dealing with al Qaeda. First of all, they began to get very serious about freezing 
the assets of not only Osama bin Ladin, but also of the Taliban itself. This hampered the 
terror groups ability to freely and easily spread wealth around the world to fund further 
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attacks. Secondly, the administration started to look to Pakistan as leverage against the 
Taliban. In fact, President Clinton planned a trip to Pakistan in 2000, even as the Secret 
Service advised against it for security reasons. When he met with Pakistani President 
Musharraf, Clinton pleaded with him to up the pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden 
in return for better relations with the United States. Clinton‟s one day stop over on 25 
March 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969, illustrating our 
lack of influence in that important part of the world.
35
  
 Next, Richard Clarke and others decided to explore the option of funding and 
equipping an Afghan tribal group known as the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance 
controlled much of northern Afghanistan and their leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was at 
war with both the Taliban and Osama bin Ladin. Massoud was more than willing to work 
with the United States and the CIA developed a fairly extensive relationship with him.
36
 
Having these eyes on the ground was a useful tactic.  However, numerous concerns 
abounded, including staunch opposition to the relationship by the Pakistanis who had 
been long time adversaries of the Northern Alliance. U.S. intelligence continued its 
contact with the Northern Alliance up to and after 9/11, as will be discussed later, when 
they would become a significant ally when American forces invaded Afghanistan in 
October of 2001. 
 The final significant counterterrorism development of the year 2000 was the 
implementation of the unmanned Predator drone aircraft, of which Richard Clarke was 
quite fond. At this point, the Predator was unarmed and used only as a way to spy on the 
enemy. The Predator allowed the U.S. military and intelligence community to have eyes 
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in the sky without putting lives at risk. On 7 September 2000, the Predator flew for the 
first time over Afghanistan.
37
 Astonishingly, on a flight later that month, a Predator flew 
over Tarnak Farms and relayed video of a tall man in white standing outside the 
compound. Many intelligence officials believed the man to be Osama bin Ladin – but the 
decision was made not to act. The main reason given by the administration was that the 
risk of collateral damage was too high. In other words, too many innocent woman and 
children could be hurt and killed by any armed attack and President Clinton did not want 
to risk handing bin Ladin an opportunity to stoke his recruitments. “I felt it would hurt 
America‟s interests if we killed a lot of Afghani women and children and didn‟t even get 
him,” Clinton recalled.38 The armed version of the Predator flew after al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan only following September 11. It proved highly successful.
39
  
 Despite this process, on October 12, 2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat 
laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole, ripping a large hole 
in its side killing seventeen American Sailors. The Cole was a 505-foot, billion dollar 
Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyer docked in Aden, Yemen.
40
 The attack on 
the Cole was similar to an aborted attack planned against the USS Sullivan eight months 
earlier. This time, the plan worked to perfection and was a major victory for al Qaeda. 
The success of the attack ended up becoming a powerful recruiting tool for the terrorist 
group.
41
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Following the operation, Osama bin Ladin was anticipating some sort of military 
response from the American government. Again, none came. One reason for this was that 
officials in the Clinton Administration wanted to be completely sure that it was al Qaeda 
behind the attack before they would respond, even though most experts were positive that 
bin Ladin ordered the attack. Moreover, the nation was in the midst of a dramatic 
presidential election with numerous recounts that lasted more than a month. The Clinton 
Administration thought it would be counterproductive to begin a military action in 
Afghanistan only a month before a new president would be inaugurated. In sum, the 
attack on the USS Cole killed seventeen brave Americans, was used as a propaganda tool 
for al Qaeda and caused countless men from all over the Middle East to travel to 
Afghanistan to join the Jihad. Besides the investigation into the attack, there was no 
significant response to this brazen act of terror. The Cole attack hit officers and analysts 
in the CIA‟s Counterterrorist Center very hard. The millennium period had been a 
succession of terrifying near misses, but they had gotten through unscathed. Now they 
had taken the first big loss at bin Ladin‟s hands since the Africa embassy attacks.42 
X 
 At best, the Clinton Administration‟s legacy on dealing with Islamic terrorism is 
unsatisfactory. By the end of 2000, bin Ladin‟s terror network was operating in more than 
fifty-five countries and were already responsible for deaths of thousands, including fifty-
nine Americans.
43
 When Bill Clinton left office in early 2001, he left his successor an al 
Qaeda terror group that was more powerful than ever. Moreover, as the Bush 
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Administration began its transition into power, al Qaeda operatives were already in the 
United States preparing to carry out an attack the likes of which had never been seen.  
To his credit, during Clinton‟s years in office the United States did become 
somewhat more proactive in counterterrorism as circumstances worsened. The CIA and 
FBI began allocating large assets to fighting terrorism and they were successful at the 
grassroots level. Because of the hard work of individual agents, the millennium attack 
was thwarted and numerous arrests of high-valued individuals were carried out. 
However, Clinton‟s unwillingness to fight the terrorism problem as a war, rather than a 
law enforcement issue, will forever tarnish his legacy on this important issue. Clinton‟s 
top advisors, especially Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen consistently seemed flummoxed by the threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
and because of this they failed the president and the American people. Their inaction cost 
lives. Osama bin Ladin himself should have never made it alive to the year 2001, but 
because of decisions made by the Clinton Administration, at the highest levels, the terror 
leader would plague the next administration, and would continue to murder the innocent 
in unprecedented numbers. “You replay everything in your mind, and you ask, „Was 
there anything else that could have been done?‟” Clinton said later. “I tried to take Mr. 
Bin Ladin out of the picture for the last four years I was in office…I don‟t think I was 
either stupid or inattentive, so he is a formidable adversary.”44 
XI 
While most people associated Osama bin Ladin as the perpetrator behind 9/11 
attacks, it was not bin Ladin who actually came up with the plot. Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (also referred to as KSM) devised what became known as the “Planes 
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Operation” in the mid 1990‟s. After he saw his nephew Ramzi Yousef fail to bring down 
the World Trade Center with a truck bomb, he realized that using explosives could be 
problematic and unpredictable. He therefore drew up a plan to hijack airliners and 
basically use them as guided missiles. A second part of the plan, which was later nixed by 
bin Ladin, was to blow up commercial airliners over the Pacific Ocean simultaneous with 
the attack taking place on the East Coast.  
Ironically, KSM was actually educated in the United States. He graduated from 
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in December 1986. Although 
he appartently did not attract attention for extreme Islamic beliefs or activities while in 
the United States, KSM plunged into the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad soon after graduating 
from college.
45
 Lacking the resources to carry out an attack of this scale, KSM decided to 
pitch it to Osama bin Ladin who listened to KSM‟s proposal but did not initially sign on. 
At the time, bin Ladin was in the process of reorganizing himself in Afghanistan and 
KSM was not a member of al Qaeda. Eventually however, Osama bin Ladin endorsed the 
operation in 1998 or early 1999. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed then moved to Afghanistan 
and immediately began to mastermind what would eventually be the 9/11 attacks.  
The plane‟s operation was a highly secret mission within al Qaeda, with only a 
handful of top officials knowing about it. At first, bin Ladin, KSM, and a few others 
began picking targets for the plan. The World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White 
House, and the Capitol Building were a top priority to the group.
46
 After the target 
selection, Osama bin Ladin picked four trusted men who would be suicide operatives and 
carry out the attack. However, attaining visas and other travel documents became difficult 
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for a few of those selected to gain entry into the United States.  Meanwhile, a new group 
of promising al Qaeda recruits were arriving in Afghanistan from Hamburg, Germany. 
The four men who made up this group came to be known as the “Hamburg contingent.” 
They quickly became candidates to partake in the operation. The Hamburg group shared 
the anti-U.S. fervor of the other candidates for the operation, but added the enormous 
advantages of fluency in English and familiarity with life in the West, based on years that 
each member of the group had spent living in Germany.
47
 The group from Hamburg 
included Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah, two of the four eventual pilots of hijacked 
aircraft on 9/11. 
The first potential hijackers arrived in California in January of 2000. The 
members of the Hamburg cell came to the East Coast that summer and immediately 
looked to enroll in American flight schools. One of the men from Hamburg, Ramzi 
Binalshibh, was unable to enter the U.S. His first applications in May and June 2000 were 
denied because he lacked established ties in Germany ensuring his return from a trip to 
the United States. In October, he tried one last time but the prior denials were noted and 
this application was denied as well.
48
 Binalshibh was then ordered to find a replacement.  
Eventually, Zacarias Moussaoui was chosen as a possible candidate.  
During the summer of 2000, bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan 
started selecting muscle hijackers – the operatives who would storm the cockpits of the 
airliners and control the passengers. It is believed that many of these men did not even 
know the details of the operation they were selected to be a part of. They received some 
final training in Afghanistan in late 2000 and early 2001, before eventually flying into the 
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United States. Most of them arrived in Florida that summer. At the same time, the future 
hijackers were taking cross-country surveillance flights and continuing their training. By 
August of 2001, most of the pieces for the operation were in place.
49
  
XII 
Once President Bush took office, his new administration was informed by Richard 
Clarke and other former Clinton officials about the national security threats related to al 
Qaeda. Unfortunately, terrorism was non-existent as an issue in the 2000 election and 
initially not a top priority of the Bush administration. By the spring of 2001, it was 
becoming clear thanks to unprecedented amounts of intelligence chatter that a large terror 
attack was being planned and could be carried out in the very near future. However, the 
information being received by the intelligence agencies was not specific, and most 
officials believed that only an attack against American or Israeli interests overseas was 
imminent. Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of 
urgency, so much so that CIA director Tenet said that the system was “blinking red.”50 
The problem for the intelligence community in the run up to September 11 was not that 
there was a lack of information; but rather that the information that was being collected 
failed to identify enough specifics for law enforcement and other agencies to act 
accordingly.  
In August of 2001, two important events occurred related to what would happen 
on 9/11. First, on 6 August, President Bush received a memo entitled, “Bin Ladin 
Determined to Strike Inside the U.S.” The memo was a part of Bush‟s Presidential Daily 
National Security Briefing. Among other things, the memo stated that terrorists intended 
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to hijack airplanes and that they had conducted surveillance on federal buildings in New 
York.
51
 Unfortunately however, the memo was extremely vague and did not give a list of 
targets or a timeline of a possible attack. Nonetheless, law enforcement and other 
government agencies including the FAA were put on high alert. Also in August of 2001, 
Zacarias Moussaoui, the man who would come to be known as the “20th hijacker”, was 
arrested in Minnesota.  
Moussaoui had entered the U.S. in February of 2001. He later enrolled in flight 
school in Oklahoma then continued his training in Minnesota. Moussaoui‟s bizarre 
behavior and background raised red flags with some at the flight school. For example, he 
said that he did not intend to be a commercial pilot but wanted to learn how to fly a 
Boeing 747. Someone at the flight school in Minnesota alerted the FBI about Moussaoui 
and they began to investigate his past. Because of the existing laws which hampered law 
enforcement from arresting potential terrorists for years, Moussaoui was initially arrested 
on 16 August on immigration charges. Unfortunately, those same laws prevented the FBI 
from looking inside Moussaoui‟s laptop.52  
Following Moussaoui‟s arrest, the government and intel community were 
unsuccessful in putting the rest of the pieces of the puzzle together and by the beginning 
of September, those pieces involved in the plot were moving into place. A final sign of an 
impending attack took place on 9 September when Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of 
the Afghani Northern Alliance was murdered by al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as 
journalists. Some speculate that bin Ladin took out Massoud because without his 
leadership, the Northern Alliance would disintegrate and be of no service to the American 
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military should an invasion follow the coming attack.
53
 That prediction would turn out to 
be false. Meanwhile back in U.S., the terrorists in Florida began to make their way 
northward and on the morning of September 11, nineteen of them boarded four 
commercial airliners in Newark, Boston, and Washington D.C. 
XIII 
The morning of 11 September 2001 started out like any other late summer day. 
The East Coast was enjoying beautiful weather with crystal clear dark blue skies and 
warm temperatures. People all over America woke up that Tuesday morning and began 
their daily routines, completely unaware of the events that were about to transpire.  At 
8:47am, the CNN program Live at Daybreak was carrying a fluffy report on a maternity-
wear fashion show in New York. Then, at 8:48am, anchor Carol Lin broke into a 
commercial about debt relief. “This just in,” she said, “You are looking at…obviously a 
very disturbing live shot there – that is the World Trade Center, and we have 
unconfirmed reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the 
World Trade Center.”54  
The plane was American Airlines flight 11 being piloted by lead hijacker 
Mohammad Atta. Flight 11 took off from Boston‟s Logan Airport at 7:59am and was 
supposed to be on its way to Los Angeles. But Atta and four other hijackers stormed the 
plane and turned it south heading it directly for its target in Lower Manhattan. At 8:24am, 
the following transmission came from American 11: “We have some planes. Just stay 
quiet, and you‟ll be ok. We are returning to the airport.”55 The FAA was immediately 
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alerted to the status of flight 11 and numerous attempts were made to contact the cockpit. 
This was the first report of a commercial airliner being hijacked in the United States in 
decades. Mohammad Atta slammed the Boeing 767 into the North Tower at 8:46am, just 
two minutes before Carol Lin broke the news.  
Initial reports of the crash were sketchy and news organizations scrambled to find 
out more information. At first it was being reported that a small plane had crashed into 
the World Trade Center and it was probably the result of a horrific accident. As the thick 
black smoke continued to billow from the huge tower, news channels all over the country 
began to break into their live shows to cover the developing story. As the minutes ticked 
by, speculation began that it in fact was a much larger plane that had struck the North 
Tower of the World Trade Center. Some eyewitnesses were even beginning to say that it 
looked like a commercial jet. Then, at 9:03 a.m., before live audiences all over America 
tuning in on television, another plane flew directly into the South Tower.
56
 As the plane 
ripped through the building an enormous fireball erupted around it. Millions of people 
were stunned at what was playing out before their eyes. Almost immediately, what many 
thought to be an accident just a minute before was now recognized to be an organized and 
concerted attack against New York. The nation was in shock. 
The second plane was United Airlines flight 175, also originating from Boston‟s 
Logan Airport and like American flight 11 the plane was travel to Los Angeles. Flight 
175 departed from Logan at 8:14 a.m. carrying five hijackers and more than enough jet 
fuel to make the cross country flight. By 9:10 a.m., the first part of the al Qaeda plot was 
over and it had been a total success. New York City was in panic mode as citizens began 
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to run from the Trade Center while thousands of first responders were getting their orders 
to head down to the burning towers.  
As this was happening in New York, President Bush was at Emma T. Booker 
Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida for an event to promote his education policy. 
Bush had been notified upon his arrival at the school about American Airlines flight 77 
which hit the North Tower. At 9:06 a.m., the president‟s Chief of Staff Andy Card 
stepped up to the President who was sitting in a chair partaking in Sandra Kay Daniel‟s 
second grade class and whispered into his ear, “A second plane hit the second tower. 
America is under attack.”57 The President‟s face showed the distress of the news he had 
just been given. A few minutes later he excused himself and was taken to a holding room 
where he called the vice president and saw television coverage of what was happening in 
New York. The President had prepared to make a speech in the library that morning, but 
instead he gave a generic acknowledgment of the attack: 
“Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America. I um, will 
unfortunately be going back to Washington after my remarks. Secretary Rod 
Paige and the Lieutenant Governor will take the podium and discuss education. I 
do want to thank the folks here at uh, Booker Elementary School for their 
hospitality. Today we‟ve had a national tragedy. Two airplanes, have crashed, 
into the World Trade Center – in an apparent terrorist attack on our country. I 
have spoken to the vice president, to the governor of New York, to the Director of 
the FBI and I‟ve ordered that the full resources of the federal government go to 
help the victims and their families and to conduct a full scale investigation to hunt 
down and to find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our nation 
will not stand. And now if you‟d join me in a moment of silence. May God bless 
the victims, their families and America. Thank you very much.”58   
 
After his remarks, the president left the school and headed for the airport, where 
Air Force One was to fly him back to Washington. However, on his way to the airport, 
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Mr. Bush was notified that the Pentagon had been hit. Almost immediately, the decision 
was made not to bring the president back to Washington, he would instead be flown to a 
safer location. The President strongly wanted to return to Washington and only 
grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere.
59
 At first, the President‟s next stop was unknown, 
even to him. His staff had decided the best and safest course of action was simply to take 
off, ascend very high, very quickly, and then decide their next step. 
 While the President was in the air, all major government offices around the capital 
city were being evacuated as the black smoke from the Pentagon could be seen for miles. 
An entire side of the building was on fire and people who worked inside were running for 
their lives. The Pentagon, like the World Trade Center, which was still burning 230 miles 
up the coast, had been struck by a hijacked airplane. The plane was American Airlines 
Flight 77 scheduled from Washington to Los Angeles. AA 77 departed Washington 
Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. carrying five would-be hijackers.  
On the flight was Barbara Olsen, the wife of Ted Olsen, the solicitor general of 
the United States. At some point between 9:16 a.m. and 9:26 a.m., Mrs. Olsen called her 
husband and reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and 
box cutters.
60
 At 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, 
traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour. All on board perished, and many other 
civilian and military personnel in the building were killed.
61
 It was the first successful 
attack on the Capital of the United States since the War of 1812. 
At almost the exact moment the Pentagon was stuck by an aircraft, a call from a 
flight attendant aboard another airplane phoned United Airlines to notify them that they 
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had been hijacked. The plane was United Airlines Flight 93. United 93 took off from 
Newark International Airport at 8:42 a.m. and was scheduled to fly to San Francisco.    
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93 – 33 in addition to 
four hijackers. The terrorists who hijacked the three other commercial flights on 9/11 
operated in five-man teams. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this 
flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration 
inspector at Florida‟s Orlando International Airport in August.62 
After the hijackers got control of the plane, somewhere above Cleveland, Ohio, 
the pilot turned the aircraft southeast – heading directly for Washington D.C. Unlike on 
the other flights, the terrorists aboard United Airlines Flight 93 had lost their needed 
element of surprise as many of the passengers got word of the carnage taking place 
around the country from family members they reached via cell phones and air phones. 
The passengers were told by their hijackers they would be returning to the airport and to 
stay calm, but after hearing about the other suicide missions, they knew that doing 
nothing most likely meant certain death. At 9:57 a.m., the passenger revolt began. Several 
passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the insurrection. 
One of the callers ended her message as follows: “Everyone‟s running up to first class. 
I‟ve got to go. Bye.”63 
With angry passengers counterattacking, Ziad Jarrah who was piloting the plane, 
began swaying the aircraft back and forth to knock them off balance as they were 
approaching the cockpit. Realizing that it was only a matter of time before the passengers 
broke down the cockpit door and attempted to regain control of the plane, Jarrah asked 
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another hijacker, “Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other replied, 
“Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.” With the sound of the passengers counterattack 
continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 
miles per hour, about 20 minutes flying time from Washington D.C.
64
 The exact 
destination of United 93 will never be known, but many have speculated that it was 
intended to hit the Capitol Building. With the passengers of United Flight 93 successfully 
stopping the hijackers from reaching their intended target by sacrificing their own lives in 
order to save countless others, it is said that what took place aboard that plane was 
America‟s first victory in the War on Terrorism.  
 Back in New York, disaster turned to catastrophe at 9:59 a.m. when the South 
Tower of The World Trade Center collapsed. The south tower was the second of the two 
buildings to be hit, but because of where the plane struck much lower than the first the 
structural integrity of the tower was much weaker. The inferno caused by thousands of 
tons of jet fuel was simply too much for the steel structure to handle. When the 110-story 
building fell onto the streets of Lower Manhattan, it created a plume of smoke, dust and 
debris that covered the bottom third of the island. The collapse also killed everyone still 
stranded inside of the tower, including the countless number of rescuers who rushed in 
after the plane hit. Exactly a half an hour later, at 10:29 a.m., the north tower collapsed. 
Two of the top five tallest buildings in the world were in ruins as a result of the brazen 
attacks.  
 Survivors in Lower Manhattan began a major exodus out of that part of the city. 
Many headed north – thousands of people walked to the bridges that led to Brooklyn – 
and others caught the few ferries that were still operating to New Jersey. America‟s 
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largest city was in complete disarray. Also in disarray was the government as it was 
trying to cope and fully understand exactly what was happening. It is safe to say that the 
terrorist attacks caught the American government completely by surprise. Although there 
was a substantial amount of intelligence gathered throughout the summer of 2001 
regarding a possible attack, the U.S. government never anticipated to deal with an attack 
on this scale.  
 When the president took off from Florida aboard Air Force One, he immediately 
called the vice-president who was in the presidential bunker below the White House. Mr. 
Cheney, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Transportation Secretary 
Norm Mineta were in the bunker as the Secret Service was tracking United 93 heading 
directly for Washington. As United 93 got closer and closer to the White House, covering 
a mile every seven seconds, Cheney conferred with Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and then asked Bush to order the United jetliner shot down.
65
 The president did 
eventually give the order to shoot down civilian commercial airliners if they were 
deemed to be unresponsive and potentially hostile. The decision was unprecedented. 
According to Richard Clarke, President Bush made three important decisions that 
morning, “One, the president had ordered the use of force against aircraft deemed to be 
hostile. Two, the White House requested a fighter escort of Air Force One. Three, and 
this applied to all agencies, they initiated COG.” COG was Continuity of Government, a 
supersecret doomsday plan to keep the Federal government running no matter how badly 
it was attacked.
66
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Unfortunately, the military was also unprepared to effectively respond on the 
morning of September 11. Bureaucratic difficulties between the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and military caused mass confusion over which planes were 
hijacked and where they were heading. Eventually the FAA ordered a ground-stop of all 
aircraft within the United States, meaning that no aircraft, commercial or private, was to 
takeoff anywhere in America.  They also ordered all incoming international flights to 
either turn around or to land in Canada. Neither had never happened before.  
The military was also having trouble finding an adequate number of fighter jets to 
even fly defensive air patrols over Washington and New York. Moreover, two jets planes 
that were in the air doing exercises that morning were radioed and told to head for United 
93 with the intention of taking the flight out if it did not follow orders to land. However, 
those planes were unarmed, so their only course of action would have been to 
intentionally ram the plane potentially killing the fighter pilot. When asked about this 
order, one military commander said, “As military men, there are times you have to make 
sacrifices.”67 By the time the fighters had reached the vicinity of  United 93 it had already 
crashed near Shanksville.  
By mid-morning the attacks had stopped, but not before causing devastation in 
two of America‟s largest cities and costing the lives of nearly 3,000 innocent civilians. 
For the rest of that day, Americans were glued to their television sets as almost every 
cable channel was either carrying affiliated news coverage or went off the air entirely. 
Shock was beginning to turn to anger, and the American public was waiting to hear from 
their president.  
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George W. Bush had only been in office for eight months when 9/11 happened. 
The former two-term governor of Texas had practically no foreign policy experience 
when he was elected, and at that time, nobody seemed to care as foreign policy issues 
took a back seat to those dealing with domestic policy. Within a matter of hours that 
morning, his entire presidency changed as he went from a peacetime president to a 
wartime Commander-in-Chief. But before there could be retaliation, Bush knew his first 
goal was to comfort a sad and scared country. At 8:30 that evening, the president 
addressed the nation. 
 In perhaps his best speech either before or since, President Bush was able to 
console the nation and reassure them that even though the attacks were horrific, America 
was still as strong a country as it was the day before. “These acts of mass murder were 
intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is 
strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can 
shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of 
America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve,” the 
president said. 
68
 
Thus ended one of the darkest days in American history. What happened on 11 
September 2001 was the biggest failure by the United States government since the Civil 
War. A government‟s most sacred and serious duty is to protect its people and the Bush 
Administration took that for granted in their first eight months in power, just as the 
Clinton Administration had before it. Had the intelligence community been more vigilant 
in the years before 9/11, the plot most likely would have been thwarted and all the lives 
lost that morning could have been spared. As a result of the attacks something had to be 
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done and it was evident by most, both inside government and out, that changes must be 
made not only to American foreign policy but also to our national security apparatus.   
XV 
 Americans woke up on 12 September in a new world. Almost everyone knew that 
the attacks that took place the morning before changed things, but exactly how much 
would change was still uncertain. The American people were looking to their government 
for answers. That morning, President Bush called a meeting of his newly formed war 
cabinet. The meeting had numerous objectives, the most important of which was 
determining who was behind the attacks. Flanked by Secretary of State Colin Powell to 
his right and Vice President Dick Cheney at his left, the president said at the meeting that 
what happened the day before was “more than an act of terror, it was an act of war.”  He 
went on to say that it “was a monumental struggle between good and evil, and that good 
will prevail.”69  
Though he never made a reference of blame for the attack, Osama bin Ladin was 
the primary suspect from the beginning for many inside intelligence circles. They 
believed that bin Ladin was the only international terrorist with the resources, such as the 
money and the manpower, to pull off such an extravagant attack. As mentioned 
previously in this analysis, there had been many warnings about bin Ladin‟s intent to 
attack American targets, but few foresaw such a brazen attack on the American mainland.  
  By late 2001, Osama bin Ladin was still relatively unknown to the American 
people. Unless a person closely followed world events, the name bin Ladin would not 
have meant much. Moreover, words like Taliban and al Qaeda were similarly new to the 
American lexicon, but in the days following the attack, people were being inundated with 
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these new phrases as everyone tried to educate themselves as to who was behind the 
attack and why they did it.  
 For his part, President Bush was forced, like any wartime president, to do two 
main things: plan the war effort behind the scenes while simultaneously getting public 
support for military action from the people. In this situation, however, the president had a 
third duty, and that was to heal the nation. The American people do not get rattled easily. 
Throughout our history we have been fortunate that the atrocities of most foreign wars 
have stayed far away, but 9/11 brought the horror home. As early as the day after the 
attack, citizens of New York and surrounding areas began covering parts of the city with 
posters with the pictures of loved ones who might still be trapped in the ruins of the 
World Trade Center. American flags were being bought in record numbers as people who 
had never flown the flag put it outside their homes and on their cars. And candlelight 
vigils were held around the nation for those who had lost their lives. The country needed 
leadership and George W. Bush knew he needed to step up.  
Once Bush adjourned his cabinet meeting on 12 September he went to the 
Pentagon to survey the damage. He shook hands with first responders and others who 
were there trying to pull anyone they could out of the rubble. The president made 14 
September a National Day of Remembrance. To commemorate the day, President Bush 
gave a speech at the National Cathedral in Washington saying, “God's signs are not 
always the ones we look for.  We learn in tragedy that his purposes are not always our 
own.  Yet the prayers of private suffering, whether in our homes or in this great cathedral, 
are known and heard, and understood. There are prayers that help us last through the day, 
or endure the night.  There are the prayers of friends and strangers, that give us strength 
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for the journey.  And there are prayers that yield our will to a will greater than our 
own.”70 
After his speech in Washington, the president traveled to the still smoldering ruins 
of the World Trade Center, now dubbed Ground Zero. During the visit, the president 
greeted dozens of tireless workers at the site. In perhaps his most inspiring moment as 
president, Bush, standing on nothing more than a pile of rubble and speaking with a 
bullhorn was being yelled at by onlookers in the crowd that they could not hear him. 
Unfazed, Bush famously retorted, “I can hear you. I hear you, the rest of the world hears 
you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.”71   
On 20 September the president addressed a joint session of Congress. The speech 
to Congress and the nation marked a shift from healing to a march toward war. The 
president outlined in no uncertain terms that the war the country was about to endure was 
going to be different. It would not be conventional and it would not be easy. The speech 
was incredibly optimistic, attempting to get the American people on board by ensuring 
them that victory was a certainty.  
The president also introduced Osama bin Ladin, the Taliban and al Qaeda to the 
American people giving them a crash course on who they were and where they lived. 
Moreover, the president also outlined what his foreign policy would look during the 
speech when he said, “And tonight, the United States of America makes the following 
demands on the Taliban:  Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda 
who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you 
have unjustly imprisoned.  Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your 
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country.  Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to 
appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so 
we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to 
negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand 
over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”72 Making no distinction between the 
terrorists and the nations that harbor them became known as The Bush Doctrine, a totally 
different policy than the one embraced by the Clinton administration. The president 
ended the speech this way: 
Great harm has been done to us.  We have suffered great loss.  And in our grief 
and anger we have found our mission and our moment.  Freedom and fear are at 
war.  The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and 
the great hope of every time -- now depends on us.  Our nation -- this generation -
- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future.  We will rally 
the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage.  We will not tire, we will 
not falter, and we will not fail.   It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, 
life will return almost to normal.  We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that 
is good.  Even grief recedes with time and grace.  But our resolve must not 
pass.  Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it 
happened.  We'll remember the moment the news came -- where we were and 
what we were doing.  Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of 
rescue.  Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever. And I will 
carry this:  It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the 
World Trade Center trying to save others.  It was given to me by his mom, 
Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son.  This is my reminder of lives that ended, 
and a task that does not end.  I will not forget this wound to our country or those 
who inflicted it.  I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this 
struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this 
conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain.  Freedom and fear, justice and 
cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between 
them.   Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice -- assured of the 
rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come.  In all that lies 
before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of 
America.
73
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Bush‟s message and performance in the week following the terror attacks seemed 
to have resonated very well with the public. Eight out of 10 Americans watched Bush‟s 
address to Congress on television, a record, and were impressed, resulting in his 
popularity rating soaring to 91 percent, the same as his father, George Bush, Sr., achieved 
in the afterglow of the Gulf War a decade earlier.
74
 With the nation firmly behind him it 
was time for this untested president to rally a bruised America away from grief and anger 
toward resolve and patience. Meanwhile, the American military, the most powerful 
military in the history of the world, was gearing up for a new kind of war and the first 
war of the 21
st
 century.  
XVI 
By mid September of 2001, it was clear within the Bush Administration that 
Afghanistan would be the first battlefield of the war on terrorism. That same month, the 
U.S. Senate passed a resolution by 98 votes to none, authorizing the president to use “all 
appropriate and necessary force” against nations, organizations or individuals who were 
involved in the acts of terrorism against America or harbored people who were 
involved.
75
 
76
 Differing from the policy of the Clinton Administration, however, it was 
not going to be sufficient simply to remove bin Ladin from the country, but rather to take 
out the Taliban leadership in Kabul and support regime change and nation building, 
something George W. Bush was against during his campaign for the presidency. 
However, Afghanistan in general was a mystery to many Americans including most 
inside the government.  
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The country of Afghanistan had essentially been in political and social anarchy 
since the Soviets pulled out in 1989 and very little if any relations had been attempted by 
the U.S. thereafter. “On a percentage basis,” the leading Western analyst of the Red 
Army‟s Afghan war estimated, “the Soviet Union inflicted more suffering on Afghanistan 
than German inflicted on the Soviet Union in World War II.
77
 From 1992 to 1996 the 
country was basically run by various mujahedeen groups. Then in 1996, the Taliban came 
to power inside the country under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Taliban is a Pashto and 
Persian word of Arabic origin referring to lower-level students of Islam, usually from 
poor, rural backgrounds and always male.
78
 When they captured control of Kabul in 
September of 1996, the Taliban enjoyed unchallenged control of 70 percent of 
Afghanistan, and it subdued much of the remaining territory over the next two years. At 
one point during his tenure in office, the administration of Bill Clinton viewed the 
Taliban favorably and sent high-level officials to consult with its leaders.
79
 The reasons 
for American interest in Afghanistan were their oil supply and also their proximity to 
Iran. Nothing substantial came out of those meetings and only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates ever officially recognized the Taliban as a legitimate 
government.
80
 During the late 1990‟s, the Taliban increasingly isolated its neighbors 
which included such powerful world-players as China, Russia, and the aforementioned 
Iran.  
At the same time, terrorist activity inside of Afghanistan was beginning to reach a 
fevered pitch. In the five years after 1996, al Qaeda trained some 11,000 recruits in 
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Afghanistan, up to 3,000 of them aspiring terrorists and suicide bombers. By late 2001, 
some 6,500 foreign al Qaeda fighters were stationed at dozens of bases around the 
country, the majority in Kabul and east.
81
 Osama bin Ladin was amassing a small army of 
terrorists from his safe haven in Afghanistan and the Taliban was aiding the effort. 
Disturbingly, the rest of the world, including the United States, permitted this 
mobilization.  
By late September of 2001, while the Pentagon was busy finalizing war plans, 
President Bush was doing his best to forge a coalition of willing nations to assist the U.S. 
in its new effort to combat global terrorism. With most of the world behind him, Bush 
reached out to Pakistan, a nation that was a long time ally of the Taliban. Moreover, 
nearly all observers assert that the government of Pakistan was instrumental in the rapid 
rise of the Taliban, possibly even its creation.
82
 Realizing the mounting pressure on his 
nation, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf decided to solicit full cooperation with the 
U.S. led coalition, a decision that would cause him great political harm. But Musharraf 
knew that the writing was on the wall for the Taliban, and continued support of them 
from his government could make themselves a future target of the United States. The 
willingness of the Pakistanis to cooperate with the U.S. was a major benefit for the Bush 
administration as they went forward and Musharraf himself became vitally important. 
Pakistan was a nuclear power, so it was of paramount importance that the Musharraf 
regime remained in tact.  
On 7 October 2001, in a brief address to the nation, President Bush announced the 
beginning of military actions in Afghanistan codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom. 
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The operation would involve both ground and air units to root out members of al Qaeda 
and the Taliban with the intent to capture or kill. The operation began with a series of 
strikes by numerous aircraft including both bombers and fighters, along with Tomahawk 
cruise missiles launched from ships and submarines. United States Special Forces were 
used heavily in the early days of the war because of their ability to get into and out of 
tough and hostile terrain. During initial combat operations in northern Afghanistan as part 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, Army Special Forces were tested to a degree not seen 
since the Vietnam War. With little time to prepare for this mission, Special Forces teams 
were to land by helicopter deep in hostile territory, contact members of the Northern 
Alliance, and coordinate their activities in a series of offensives.
83
 
The Northern Alliance, as noted earlier, had for years been in contact with 
American intelligence agencies and would play a crucial role in helping the U.S. military 
dismantle the Taliban‟s control in Afghanistan. American Special Forces worked along 
side Northern Alliance troops to take control of important population centers like Kabul, 
Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. By mid November, the Taliban was in disarray and what 
was left of al Qaeda was on the run.   
After the fall of Kabul, al Qaeda and Taliban forces had retreated into major 
strongholds in the Tora Bora Mountains south of Jalalabad near the Pakistani border, 
some of the most rugged terrain in the world. The terrorists had controlled the area for 
years, digging hundreds of caves and refuges and establishing their training camps. In 
addition to being intimately familiar with the area, they had emplaced extensive 
fortifications and stockpiled weapons and ammunition to fight a protracted defense.
84
 
                                                 
83
 http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm 
84
 http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm 
45 
 
Osama bin Ladin, his top deputy Ayman al Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mullah 
Omar all were able to escape the initial onslaught brought to Afghanistan by the United 
States military. It is believed that they also made their way to the mountainous security of 
Tora Bora by December of 2001. Despite thousands of sorties called in by Special Forces 
troops in the area, it is thought that all three men were able to survive the barrage and 
make their way into the extreme eastern Pakistan where they would be protected by 
sympathetic tribesmen. Nobody is certain of the physical condition the three men were in 
when they escaped Afghanistan in late 2001, although some intelligence reports have 
stated that bin Ladin himself was seriously injured during an airstrike while he was still 
in Tora Bora; that report has never been substantiated. Audio and video footage of the 
terror leader that have surfaced since 2002 seem to indicate that he in fact did survive any 
injury.
85
  
By early 2002, the United States military effectively rid Afghanistan of Taliban 
rule, without much of any significant organized resistance. Al Qaeda elements also were 
driven out of the country as a result of the American military. Now the Administration 
back in Washington had to set up a democratic government inside of the war torn nation. 
At the CIA several officers proposed Hamid Karzai as the new Afghani president. Karzai 
was a moderate Afghan leader who had been a junior minister under the Taliban but 
defected and joined the opposition. Karzai took the oath of office as Afghanistan‟s 
president on 22 December 2001 – just 102 days after 9/11.86 It would have seemed that 
the swift military victory in Afghanistan followed by the creation of a semi-stable 
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government in Kabul meant that the United States had succeeded in the first theater of the 
Global War on Terrorism.  
Unfortunately, hindsight has proven that not to be the case. There are many 
reasons that the war in Afghanistan cannot yet be labeled a success.  First and foremost, 
now seven years since the first shots were fired, the war has not ended. Why? Well for 
starters, some believe the fact that the U.S. waited almost a month after 9/11 to attack 
Afghanistan allowed many senior members of al Qaeda and the Taliban including bin 
Ladin, al Zawahiri and Mullah Omar to escape. Moreover, some intelligence reports 
indicate that bin Ladin began dispersing members of al Qaeda out of Afghanistan to 
nearby countries before the attack on America anticipating a severe response. Also, when 
the aforementioned leaders hid in the Tora Bora Mountains, American military leaders 
were unwilling to use boots on the ground to hunt them down, deciding rather to rely on 
airpower against the wishes of CIA officers in the area. Furthermore, once bin Ladin and 
other left over Taliban and al Qaeda arrived in the border area between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the U.S. seemed incapable of devising a coherent policy to go after them. 
Inadequate resources on the ground along with an unwillingness to carry out any military 
operations inside of Pakistani territory made the area a safe haven for the terrorists.
87
  
The Karzai government however was able to gain a respectable foothold in 
Afghanistan, but only with substantial aid both financially and militarily from the 
Americans and eventually NATO. That is not to say that the country was or has ever been 
completely pacified. Remnants of the Taliban continue to mount offensives, primarily in 
the spring, against Afghani and coalition security forces. Although they are continuously 
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defeated, they are still, to this day, able to retreat to the tribal areas of the 
Afghan/Pakistan border to regroup.  
By mid-2002, without a clear cut victory to speak of in Afghanistan, the Bush 
Administration was already beginning to set its sights on the next theater in the war on 
terror and this time the bulls eye was on a country that had no solid connection to the 
events of 9/11, but had been a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy makers for the 
better part of 20 years. But before the war in Iraq commenced, the Bush White House 
was busy dramatically transforming their intelligence gathering capabilities. Those 
changes, which would become a political liability for Mr. Bush, became powerful tools in 
thwarting future attacks and in apprehending many highly sought after individuals.  
                                                                  
 
XVII 
President Bush and his advisors realized that using the military was only one 
piece of the puzzle when it came to combating and capturing terrorists. New and drastic 
measures were needed to keep the American mainland safe from further attacks so in 
October of 2001, the president signed into law the USA Patriot Act. The Patriot Act made 
possible what should have been done all along. It laid out the future ground work for 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies regarding counterterrorism, most importantly, 
it made it imperative that the two work together. For years, different governmental 
bureaucracies like the FBI and CIA were unwilling to share vital information and in 
many cases actually competed against one another. In a post 9/11 world, those types of 
petty squabbles were unacceptable. The Patriot Act, passed in late 2001, vastly expanded 
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the ability of United States law enforcement agencies to go after and hunt down 
suspected terrorists both domestically and abroad – much to the chagrin of many civil 
libertarians. A central provision of the bill was the removal of “the wall” on information 
sharing between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
88
 The Patriot Act 
was legislative proof that the Bush administration was now serious about combating 
terror and it showed that they were willing to do anything they could within the law to 
protect America. The bill was strongly supported by both major political parties and 
passed both Houses of Congress with ease.  
Another change instituted by the Bush administration as a result of the 9/11 
attacks was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. This new department 
was to be headed up by a cabinet level official who would be in charge of coordinating 
the effort to protect the American mainland. President Bush nominated popular 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to be the first Secretary of Homeland Security and he 
was easily confirmed.  
Things also changed around the world. It was now the policy of the United States 
to hunt down suspected terrorists anywhere they were, regardless of which country‟s 
borders they found themselves within. Actionable human intelligence on the ground was 
always the preferred method of capturing a terrorist alive. That way they could be 
interrogated and hopefully give up valuable information regarding a future attack. But the 
U.S. military was once again relying heavily on the Predator drone. The Predator proved 
to be an effective anti-terror tool and would later be armed with missiles to take out 
suspected terrorist hideouts. But again, having people on the ground was always the 
preferred method.  
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In March of 2002, there was actionable intel on a high value al Qaeda terrorist 
named Abu Zubaydah. Zubaydah had run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of 
the 9/11 hijackers trained. He was, says an FBI official, like a U.S. Army recruiting 
station for al Qaeda.
89
 As a high ranking member of the terror group, capturing Zubaydah 
was a top priority. By late March, the CIA amassed a team to act on intelligence they had 
received as to Zubaydah‟s whereabouts and on the 28 March, he was captured alive. Abu 
Zubaydah turned out to be in a two-story house in Faisalabad, an industrial city in Punjab 
Province in Western Pakistan.
90
 Psychologically, getting Zubaydah was a significant 
victory inside of a depressed and browbeaten United States intelligence community. 
During Zubaydah‟s subsequent detention, the CIA began to implore certain coercive 
interrogation methods to get him to talk. While it is still not clear exactly what Zubaydah 
was faced to endure, there have been reports by various media outlets that he was forced 
to do things like stand for an extended period of time and also face sleep deprivation. 
Moreover, Zubaydah is also believed to have undergone something known as 
waterboarding.  
Waterboarding is a highly controversial form of interrogation. During 
waterboarding, the suspect is put flat on his back and then has his face covered either 
with a rag or with cellophane. The interrogators then proceed to pour water on the 
person‟s face to simulate a feeling of asphyxiation and drowning. Though the process is 
extremely uncomfortable and causes the person to react with much distress, it is not life 
threatening and does not leave any permanent physical scaring. While in captivity, 
Zubaydah did begin to give the CIA valuable leads to go after other prominent al Qaeda 
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members. Zubaydah identified Ramzi Binalshibh, who was eventually captured in 
September 2002. Binalshibh was a top al Qaeda recruiter and a member of bin Ladin‟s 
inner circle.
91
 
With Osama bin Ladin and his top deputies becoming more and more elusive in 
early 2002, American intelligence operatives continued to go after other high ranking 
members of al Qaeda and particularly those who were involved in the planning and 
preparation of the 9/11 attacks. On 1 March 2003, they got their big prize. Working with 
their Pakistani counterparts in Intel known as the ISI, American officers were able to 
track down and capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – the previously mentioned 
mastermind behind the attack on the United States. Mohammed was given to the U.S., 
detained and taken into custody for interrogation. Exactly where he was taken 
immediately following his capture is still not known.  
   While in detention, KSM was questioned numerous times about his involvement 
in the planning and implementing of the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, KSM was also asked 
about his involvement in any future attacks al Qaeda was planning against the West. To 
the surprise of many inside the intelligence community, KSM seemed very willing to 
give up important information on the inner workings of al Qaeda, even naming names. 
One official said that because of his cooperation, “We‟re getting valuable, credible, 
specific information.”92 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed also later admitted to being 
responsible for perpetuating the failed plot by would be shoe-bomber Richard Reid in 
2001. Moreover, he also took the credit for personally decapitating American journalist 
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Daniel Pearl in 2002.
93
 In early 2008, The Director of Central Intelligence Michael 
Hayden admitted to an open session of Congress that the CIA had waterboarded KSM 
during his detention. Hayden has since prohibited the CIA from using the procedure.
94
  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was one of al Qaeda‟s most successful members since 
officially joining the organization back in the late 1990‟s. His high level involvement in 
more than two dozen terrorist plots has made him the most senior terrorist to be captured 
by the United States since the start of the Global War on Terrorism. Currently, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed is awaiting trial by military tribunal at the United States terrorist 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Both Ramzi Binalshibh and Abu Zubaydah 
also currently reside in American custody at Guantanamo Bay.  
XVIII 
 By mid-2002, The War on Terrorism appeared to be going along quite well. 
Afghanistan had been liberated with soft resistance, high level terrorists within al Qaeda 
were either captured or killed, the Taliban was in disarray and most of the world 
community was in lock-step behind all of the action the United States was taking. Riding 
high with popular public opinion comfortably behind him, President Bush wanted to 
expand the War on Terrorism to a second battlefield – Iraq.  
The President wondered immediately after the 9/11 attacks whether Saddam 
Hussein‟s regime might have had a hand in them.95 Ultimately cooler heads prevailed and 
it was decided within his administration that Afghanistan should be the first priority. But 
as time went on, many prominent players inside the Bush administration were convinced 
that any War on Terrorism would not be successful without targeting Saddam Hussein‟s 
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regime inside of Iraq. The first Gulf War, begun by the president‟s father, failed to take 
out Hussein after he invaded Kuwait in 1990, and over the next decade, Saddam was 
constantly playing the role of antagonist against the United States.  
Post 9/11, the Bush administration‟s philosophy was that it was too risky to have 
an enemy of the United States ruling a nation that could possibly be in possession of 
weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein had actually used chemical weapons 
against Iraq‟s own Kurdish population in Halabja in late 1988.96 Hussein routinely kicked 
out United Nations weapons inspectors in violation of the sanctions set in place by that 
body following the first Gulf War, which only added to the suspicion that he was hiding 
something. Not willing to take the risk of Saddam passing a chemical or biological 
weapon to a terrorist organization, President Bush looked to the U.S. intelligence 
community, the same group that failed us prior to 9/11, to find out what they could about 
the current state of Saddam Hussein‟s weapons program.  
The Bush administration used three key events to make its case for war against 
Iraq using WMD as its primary argument. First was the National Intelligence Estimate 
titled Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction released in October 
of 2002. Second was the unanimous passage by the United Nations of UN resolution 
1441 which gave Saddam Hussein one last chance to comply with weapons inspections 
and disarmament. And finally there was then Secretary of State Colin Powell‟s testimony 
to the United Nations on 5 February 2003.
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 Powell‟s speech at the United Nations was 
essential in making the case for war. Colin Powell had been a highly respected public 
servant by both sides of the political aisle, so most people were willing to believe what he 
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had to say. Powell told the UN that, “every statement I make today is backed up by 
sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we‟re giving you are facts and 
conclusions based on solid intelligence.”98 Powell passionately closes his remarks this 
way: 
For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam Hussein has pursued his 
ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he 
knows: intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his 
way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the 
ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition. 
We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass 
destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of 
aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of 
his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those 
who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these 
weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the 
world is in a much weaker position to respond? 
The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. 
Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few 
more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world. 
My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council recognized that Iraq 
continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had 
been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. 
Today, Iraq sti ll poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, 
by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq 
has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face 
serious consequences for its continue defiance of this Council. 
My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We have an obligation to 
this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in 
order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to 
give Iraq one last chance. 
Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance. 
We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty 
and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this 
body. 
Thank you, Mr. President.
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 Powell‟s powerful testimony did what it was intended to do, in that the American 
people along with much of the world community believed that Saddam Hussein 
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possessed weapons of mass destruction. By early March, three out of four American‟s 
supported invading Iraq.
100
 On 19 March 2003, President Bush ordered the beginning of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The mission was to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime 
from power and find his stockpiles of weapons. While the former was completed with 
relative ease initially, the latter never materialized and no weapons were ever found. The 
war in Iraq has continued however, and today, almost six years after it began, there are 
still more than 130,000 American troops inside Iraq and 4,138 brave servicemen have 
sacrificed their lives.
101
 
 The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was just another in a long 
line of intelligence problems that have plagued our government over the past three 
decades when it comes to combating global terrorism. What happened prior to 9/11 
transcends politics with both major political parties and two presidential administrations, 
one Democrat and one Republican, failing to take the terror threat seriously costing 
innocent people their lives. 
Conclusion 
Fear is a powerful emotion. It can make a person do things that they would not do 
under normal circumstances. Fear is what Americans did not have before 9/11. We were 
complacent with our peace. Our belief that oceans would always protect us blinded our 
ability take threats on our nation‟s security seriously. In my opinion, and after all of my 
research, that is the answer to why we failed. It might be simplistic, but we as a people, 
from powerful to poor, from presidents to peasants, from Democrat to Republican, never 
imagined that we would be hit the way we were on 9/11. Complacency is the reason 
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Osama bin Ladin was not taken out at Tarnak Farms in 1998. It is why we allowed the 
9/11 hijackers to travel in, out and around America for more than a year before the 
attacks without knowledge of their presence. It is why there was no military response 
after seventeen U.S. sailors died when the USS Cole was attacked.  It is why terrorism 
was not even a major issue in the 2000 presidential election. And it is why nineteen men, 
driven by radical religious beliefs, were able to board airplanes, kill thousands of 
innocent people and shock the world on an otherwise beautiful September morning.  
 Some men, however, did try to warn the powers at be that something 
extraordinary was imminent, that al Qaeda and the likes had their sights set not on 
American targets overseas, but were looking to bring the war home to our shores. Men 
like Richard Clarke, Michael Scheurer and John O‟Neill, though not perfect, realized the 
severity of the threat but failed to convince their superiors to act accordingly. For John 
O‟Neill, his life would end as a result of a very tragic irony. After leaving the FBI in 
August of 2001, O‟Neill was hired on to be the head of security at the largest and one of 
the busiest buildings in New York City – the World Trade Center. O'Neill was in his 34th 
floor office in the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. when American Airlines Flight 11 crashes 
into it. In the minutes after the attack, O'Neill made his way to the command center that 
had been set up. There he sees an FBI agent who later said, “[John] was in FBI mode. 
Then he turned and kind of looked at me and went toward the interior of the complex. 
From the time John walked away to the time the building collapsed was certainly not 
more than a half hour or 20 minutes."
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 When the North Tower went down, John O‟Neill 
went with it.  
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At the beginning, I discussed the fear I had on the night of 11 September 2001, 
and that feeling has stuck with me to this very day. I will never forget the way I felt 
watching regular people, moms and dads, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, forced 
to jump out of the World Trade Center to their deaths only because they went to their job 
that morning, just like they had countless other mornings. I will never forget the way I 
felt when I saw images of walls around New York City plastered with the pictures and 
stories of loved ones who were still missing as the rubble in Lower Manhattan continued 
to smolder. But I now have another fear; I fear that the American people are beginning to 
once again get complacent.  
Tough counterterrorism measures put in place after the last attack have prevented 
another one for more than seven years. Policies like waterboarding and other coercive 
interrogation methods, warrantless surveillance, the Patriot Act, Guantanamo Bay and 
others while not always politically popular have saved lives. And as we transition into a 
new administration, I hope and pray that those responsible for keeping us safe going 
forward will remember the lessons we learned on 9/11 and since, so that we can continue 
to live in the peace that we all love but take so much for granted.  Nothing is more 
important.  
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